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Grading The Watson Tests
Nine years ago the Supreme Court held in Robinson v. California' that the
"status" of narcotic addiction is not of itself criminally punishable. Recent-
ly, in Watson v. United States,2 the District of Columbia Circuit laid the
foundation for extending Robinson to a manifestation of that status, i.e.,
narcotic possession by a non-pushing addict.3 Although the court declined
to apply this extension to the record before it,4 it did formulate a test to be
applied to future Watson-type defendants. This test classifies all narcotic
defendants as either (1) non-pushing addicts who possess narcotics solely
for personal use, or (2) those who do not. Chief Judge Bazelon dissented in
Watson and formulated a test which looks to the intended "use" of the nar-
cotics. Subsequently, in United States v. Ashton5 District Judge Gesell out-
lined the severe difficulties in applying the Watson classification test. This
article will analyze both Watson tests and examine the problems raised in
their application.0
1. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
2. Crim. No. 21,186 (D.C. Cir., July 15, 1970) (en banc).
3. Watson was indicted and convicted on two counts of federal narcotics violations;
unlawfully purchasing, selling, and distributing drugs, and, illegally importing the same.
The government's case consisted primarily of police testimony that they found 13 cap-
sules of heroin while lawfully searching Watson's apartment. Since Watson had two
prior narcotic violation convictions, the trial court sentenced him to 10 years imprison-
ment on both counts without the availability of suspension, probation, or parole. The
sentences were to run concurrently and in accordance with the Narcotic Addict Re-
habilitation Act of 1966 [NARA], 18 U.S.C. § 4251(f) (4) (Supp. V, 1970), because
of his two prior convictions Watson was not eligible for non-criminal treatment. On
appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the two prior felony disqualification
of NARA was unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. Consequently, the court
affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resen-
tencing. The Watson majority hesitated to reverse the defendant's conviction because
of evidence showing possible past narcotic trafficking.
4. This circuit had previously considered this same question. In Hutcherson v.
United States, 345 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 894 (1965), the court
stated that there was no meaningful distinction between the status of addiction and
possession of narcotics by an addict. But it further declared that "we cannot consider
these claims [that punishing for possession is equivalent to punishing for status] now
since they were not advanced below and no evidence was offered to show that here
possession was compelled by addiction." 345 F.2d at 978. In Castle v. United States,
347 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929 (1965), the court again
avoided the Robinson argument by stating that "although neither remote nor insubstan-
tial, [it] is one which . . . is more properly to be made to the Supreme Court." 347
F.2d at 495.
5. 317 F. Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1970).
6. Although this article will only discuss the Robinson defense, Watson also con-
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The Watson Decision
Prior to Watson, the mere possession of narcotics, gave rise to a statutory
presumption of a narcotic violation. Invariably, this presumption led to
successful convictions for a variety of offenses, e.g., selling, receiving, dis-
pensing, concealing, and importing narcotics illegally. 7 Although this pre-
sumption applied equally to the narcotic pusher and non-pushing addict,
the Watson decision limits the application of this presumption by extending
Robinson protection to the non-pushing addict alone:
Of course it is true that, as a practical matter, no addict can possess
narcotics without buying, receiving, or concealing them-acts which
. . . are "realistically inseparable from the status of addiction." So
it is that, if Robinson's deployment of the Eighth Amendment as a
barrier to California's making addiction a crime means anything, it
must also mean in all logic that (1) Congress either did not intend
to expose the non-trafficking addict possessor to criminal punish-
ment, or (2) its effort to do so is as unavailing constitutionally as
that of the California legislature.
Although this reasoning is not expressly found in Robinson, it does logically
follow from it. If, according to Robinson, a narcotic addict cannot be
criminally punished for his status, i.e., being an addict, a fortiori, he cannot
be punished for the manifestation of that status, i.e., possessing narcotics.
Commentators have advocated this extension ever since the Robinson deci-
sion.9
tended that the insanity defense should be available to him because his actions were
involuntary, i.e., compelled by his addiction. If the insanity defense was not available
to him, he argued that due process required the court to formulate a new text of criminal
responsibility for narcotics addicts, a defense the court termed "a doctrine of pharma-
cological duress." Watson v. United States, Crim. No. 21,186 at 17 n.8 (D.C. Cir.,
July 15, 1970) (en banc).
The court did not accept Watson's argument and stated that (1) Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514 (1968) places a heavy burden of proof on one making this assertion,
which burden appellant failed to meet; and (2) although this court believes that the
Powell rationale should apply to drug addicts as well as alcoholics, this application is
the prerogative of the Supreme Court.
7. Normally narcotic offenders are charged with violations under two federal stat-
utes, INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 4704(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1964). Section 4704
states in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to purchase, sell, dispense, or dis-
tribute narcotic drugs except in the original stamped package or from the
original stamped package ...
And Section 174 states:
Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic drug into the
United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction, contrary to
law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any manner facilitates the trans-
portation, concealment, or sale of any such narcotic drug . . . shall be im-
prisoned not less than five or more than twenty years, and, in addition, may
be fined not more than $20,000.
8. Crim. No. 21,186 at 19 (D.C. Cir., July 15, 1970) (en banc).
9. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of
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In extending the Robinson protection the Watson court classified narcotic
offenders in to (1) non-trafficking addicts who possess narcotics solely for
personal use, 10 and (2) all other offenders found possessing narcotics. Thus
Watson formulates a "classification" test that focuses on the defendant to
determine if the Robinson extension is available.
Although the majority refused to apply this test to Watson, it did advise
group one defendants how to proceed in the future:
For the future, the addict, whose acquisition and possession of nar-
cotics is solely for his own use and who wishes to defend on these
grounds, is surely not at a loss to know how to do so. . . . To the
extent that he wishes to assert that the [federal] statutes are not to
be read as applicable to him, his primary attack should . . . be
by a motion to dismiss [the indictment]. Such a motion would pre-
sumably make an alternative claim of the constitutional defective-
nes, under Robinson, of the statutes as applied to him."
Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police
Officers and the Like, C iM. L. BULL. 205 (1967); The Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635 (1965); Neibel,
Implications of Robinson v. California, 1 HOUSTON L. REV. 1 (1963), 29 B'LYN.
L. REV. 139 (1962).
10. Hereinafter called "addict-possessors."
11. Crim. No. 21,186 at 21-22 (D.C. Cir., July 15, 1970) (en banc). In Watson
appellant made a statutory intention argument:
[A]ppellant asserts that, although it is clear that Congress did not dis-
tinguish between the addicted and the non-addicted trafficker . . . it is by no
means clear that it grouped the mere addict possessor for use with these other
categories . . . It is appellant's submission that the [two federal statutes]
were never intended to embrace the non-trafficking addict possessor, and that
words like "purchase", "receive", and "conceal" were used in relation to acts
of participation in illegal importation, trading and distribution.
Crim. No. 21,186 at 9 (D.C. Cir., July 18, 1970) (en banc).
The purpose of the Drug Import and Export Act (Jones-Miller Act) 21 U.S.C.
§§ 171-188h (1964) was to prevent illegal importation and interstate transportation of
narcotics. The legislative intent of the Jones-Miller Act closely parallels that of the
Harrison Act. The Harrison Act, INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 4701, aimed to control the
flow of narcotics within the United States, and provided a strict regulatory scheme to
insure that legally imported narcotics were used for authorized purposes. The Jones-
Miller and Harrison Acts complemented each other: the former controlled illegally
imported narcotics, while the latter covered the use of legally imported narcotics.
Gaps in the coverage of these laws appeared when physicians abused their medical
privilege and sold narcotics to any willing purchasers, including those without prescrip-
tions. The government prosecuted these doctors and subsequently the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Harrison Act as a legitimate revenue raising measure
which had the additional benefit of controlling narcotic traffic. The government, sup-
ported by court decisions, successfully drove the drug addict away from the medical
profession into the "black market." As a regulatory measure, the Harrison Act was
successful, but it was disappointing in its effect on narcotic addiction.
The 1951 amendments increased the penalties for all violators of these two Acts but
made the penalties for sellers higher than those for possessors. Possession itself,
however, was not made a crime. The Acts merely retained the assumption that unex-
plained possession was indicative of a prohibited act (e.g., selling). Congress appar-
ently intended that a distinction be drawn between the trafficker convicted upon direct
evidence of actual sale and the assumed trafficker convicted upon the indirect evidence
19711
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Chief Judge Bazelon proposed an alternate approach. He agreed with the
majority that Robinson should be extended to the addict-possessor, but for a
different reason. His approach focuses on the intended use of the narcotics
found in a defendant's possession. If the defendant is an addict, and the
narcotics are for his personal use, the legal fiction does not arise. Using
this approach, the majority's question of whether a defendant is an addict-
possessor or not becomes irrelevant.
So long as the narcotics involved in the offense charged are those
intended by the addict for his own personal use, I can see no way
that the applicability of Robinson v. California can be thought to
course, the majority opinion does not seem to me to preclude appli-
cation of these statutes to the sale of narcotics whether or not the
seller is also addicted. 12
Thus Judge Bazelon's is a "use" test which focuses upon the one offense with
which the defendant is charged. Consequently, previous trafficking by a de-
fendant is immaterial to Judge Bazelon.
The Ashton Response
In United States v. Ashton13 District Judge Gesell reasoned that the two
Watson classifications were meaningless. He stated that "[it is a matter
of common knowledge that most addicts sell narcotics from time to time to
finance their habit, or trade heroin for the favor of food or lodging, or give
drugs to friends facing withdrawal.' 4 If an addict-possessor who trafficks
in narcotics is to be prosecuted, and if these "time to time" acts constitute
"trafficking," then the Watson majority's possession exemption "will prove
nearly meaningless, for its primary effect will be only to alter prosecutorial
techniques.' I  He called for a precise definition of trafficking to aid
trial judges in formulating jury instructions, and to "reflect the realities
of an addict's existence."' 16 Judge Gesell does not cite statistics for his
of unexplained possession.
Although a 1956 amendment to these Acts restricted the ability of a court to re-
duce a second offender's sentence by eliminating probation, suspension, and parole, the
legislative intent did not change with respect to traffickers. There appears no evidence
of an intent, either in 1951 or in 1956, to enlarge or restrict the class of offenders.
Moreover, there is no indication that the Jones-Miller Act, dealing with illegal importa-
tion, was intended to cover the non-traffickering addict. For an excellent discussion of
the history of federal narcotic statutes, see Bonnie & Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit
and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry Into the Legal History of American Mari-
juana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REv. 971 (1970).
12. Crim. No. 21,186 at 31 n.6 (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
13. 317 F. Supp. 860 (D.C.C. 1970).
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observation concerning the "time to time" addict-possessor who trafficks only
to finance his habit, but he does take judicial notice of such facts. Assuming
this judicial notice is accurate, his point is well taken. The addict-possessor
class, as defined by Watson, is too small to have any real significance.
According to Judge Gesell, there are few true addict-possessors, but many
"time to time" addicts. The second observation of Judge Gesell is that the
trial procedures suggested in Watson place the burden on the defendant to
prove first that he is an addict, and second that the narcotics he possessed
were for his own use. If the defendant must prove the first issue, Judge
Gesell claims that "a bifurcated trial may be required to avoid forcing the
defendant to testify against himself."'17  To require this, he continues,
would seriously hamper the efficiency of our judicial system.' Judge Gesell
suggests that the Watson court may wish "to place the burden on the
Government to prove as an essential element of every case . . . that the
defendant is not an addict, or that he trafficked in narcotics."' 9  However,
if Judge Bazelon's "use" test were adopted, Judge Gesell's latter suggestion
that the government prove previous occasions of trafficking would be
unnecessary.
In addition to the trafficking definition and self-incrimination problems
voiced by Judge Gesell, other difficulties with the Watson decision are
apparent. Proving addiction is relatively easy. 20  To prove that narcotics
are solely for one's own use, however, is more difficult. How can this be
realistically accomplished? The mere statement that this is so seems the only
practical solution. Once stated, the burden would shift to the government to
prove trafficking. The amount of narcotics in defendant's possession could be
the crucial difference. Dicta in Turner v. United States21 states that an
addict's possession of only a small amount of narcotics rebuts the presump-
17. Id.
18. Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, discussed this same self-
incrimination issue in his dissenting opinion in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398
(1970). At issue were the same federal statutory presumptions of Watson. Citing
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), Justice Black stated that these presumptions vio-
late the fifth amendment and almost every other basic right guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, including the right to due process of law, the right of an accused to confront
any adverse witnesses, the right to counsel, the presumption of innocence, and the
right to trial by jury. 396 U.S. at 425, 427.
19. 317 F. Supp. at 862.
20. Title II of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 4251(a),
(Supp. V, 1970), defines the term "addict":
"Addict" means any individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug as de-
fined by section 4731 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, so
as to endanger the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is or has
been so far addicted to the use of such narcotic drugs as to have lost the
power of self-control with reference to his addiction.
21. 396 U.S. 398 (1970).
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tion of his trafficking: "[h]aving a small quantity of . . . [narcotics] is
itself consistent with Turner's possessing the [narcotics] not for sale but
exclusively for his personal use."'2 2  A small quantity of narcotics, then,
would shift the burden of proof to the government. But how does one deter-
mine a "small quantity?" 23  In answering this question a defendant's daily
habit could be considered. Chief Judge Bazelon states that Watson had
successfully rebutted any presumption of trafficking when he proved that
his daily dosage was greater than the amount of narcotics found in his pos-
session.24  Thus Judge Bazelon implies that an addict apprehended with
less than his daily dosage rebuts the presumption and places the burden on
the prosecution to prove trafficking. But what of the addict-possessor who
is apprehended soon after purchasing a week's supply of narcotics? Do we
penalize simply for buying in large amounts? It might be best to follow
Judge Gesell's suggestion (not only because of the self-incrimination problem,
but also due to the difficulty in proving non-trafficking) and place the bur-
den on the government to prove both elements of the violation: (1) that
defendant is not an addict, and (2) that the narcotics in his possession were
not for his own use.25
Chief Judge Bazelon's "use" test is not without its problems. In addi-
tion to having the same self-incrimination problems as the majority's clas-
sification test, it highlights the burden of proof predicament. Because this
test looks to the single offense without considering previous trafficking, the
amount of narcotics found in the defendant's posession is critical. In ac-
cordance with the Turner dicta, if this is less than his daily dosage, he has
successfully rebutted the presumption and the government cannot success-
fully prosecute unless he is caught in the act of "trafficking." If the addict
is found with more than his daily dosage, the problem of rebutting the stat-
utory presumption of a violation appears insurmountable.
Conclusion
The Watson decision presents an interesting and unique point of view. The
District of Columbia Circuit has been in the vanguard of judicial reform in
the past, and in Watson does nothing to dispel this reputation. If its pro-
gressive approach to this very serious narcotics problem is ever to be adopted,
22. Id. at 423.
23. In Turner, the defendant had 14.68 grams of a cocaine and sugar mixture on his
person. An additional 48.25 grams of a heroin mixture were found in an automobile
that he and his two co-defendants were riding in.
24. Crim. No. 21,186 at 40 (D.C. Cir., July 15, 1970) (en banc).
25. For a full discussion of the burden of proof, see Bonnie & Whitebread, supra
note 11.
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the Watson court must provide solutions to the difficulties inherent in the
application of its classification test. By effectively disposing of this problem,
the District of Columbia Circuit will convince the other circuits of the
soundness of the Watson argument. However, until the other ten circuits
are convinced, the constitutional guarantees of addict-possessors will be
honored in the main rather than the breach only within the District of
Columbia.
Michael M. Sullivan
